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Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
Over the last decade, Afghanistan and terrorism have become synony-
mous in the eyes of many analysts and policymakers.1 Afghanistan,
of course, was the ﬁrst campaign stop—Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF)—of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and has since been
viewed as a hotbed for global terrorists and jihadists. Strictly speak-
ing, however, regional conditions—including bad governance, poverty,
oppression, corruption, and radical Islamist movements—throughout
Afghanistan and its neighbors are the primary source of terrorism in this
country. This is not meant to suggest that Afghan groups, such as the Tal-
iban, are not directly responsible for terrorism in Afghanistan. Rather, it is
to suggest that the Taliban are encouraged, enabled, funded, and driven
by foreign sources and interests and are outsourcing their logistics and
suicide missions via regional networks. To view them merely as an in-
digenous Afghan movement is to ignore critical aspects of their organiza-
tion, support, behavior, and actions—and the aforementioned conditions
in South Asia.
Today, after 27 years of continuous war, Afghanistan is struggling. Pres-
ident Karzai’s post-Taliban government is ﬁnding it extremely difﬁcult
to extend its control and mandate outside the capital of Kabul and into
the country’s vast impoverished hinterland. Several forces are undermin-
ing Karzai’s efforts to build a truly national government with national
control, including a rising tide of narcotics production now responsible
for approximately 60 percent of the country’s economy, and a resurgent
Taliban—backed by al Qaeda—who are mounting an increasingly vir-
ulent insurgency in the east and south of the country. Although Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reported in May 2003 that the war on
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terror in Afghanistan was in a “cleanup” or “mop up” phase,2 today—
almost 5 years into American military engagement in Afghanistan—the
United States is mired in an insurgency of escalating violence and lethality
which has already claimed thousands of lives. The twin insurgent move-
ments of the revitalized Taliban and the Hizb-i-Islami party of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar (HiG) are growing steadily in strength and inﬂuence, while
Kabul’s control over a broad swath of the country is rapidly diminishing.
As demonstrated by the widespread anti-American riots in Kabul in May
2006, political volatility is even starting to reach urban areas. Three fun-
damental problems in Afghanistan have allowed for the emergence of the
insurgencies:
The inability of the national government since 2001 to establish a politically
signiﬁcant presence throughout the country,
The failure of the international community to create a secure rural environment
in the south conducive to development and reconstruction, and
The virtually complete lack of meaningful improvement in the lives of the great
majority of the people in the southern half of the country.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the insurgencies in Afghanistan
and the foreign political and international terrorist elements that aid and
abet them. The ﬁrst section of the chapter will discuss the makeup and
character of the Afghan insurgencies, examining the historical founda-
tions of the Taliban and HiG. The second half of the chapter will provide
a critical assessment of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, and explore what
lessons can be drawn which could inform U.S. counterinsurgency strategy
and tactics.
THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM
On October 7, 2001, the U.S.-led coalition began its initial air campaign
against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan—forces deemed re-
sponsible for the September 11 attacks on the United States. According to
the U.S. Defense Department, the initial U.S. air campaign “eviscerated”
the Taliban’s military capability within two weeks.3 On October 18, the
U.S. “ofﬁcial” ground campaign began when U.S. Special Forces entered
northern Afghanistan and teamed up with the Northern Alliance—a loose
confederation of veteran mujahideen and warlords from non-Pashtun eth-
nic blocs who represented the Taliban’s primary resistance. By November
10, the strategic northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif fell to the Northern Al-
liance. In the following days, large swaths of the north were captured by
the Northern Alliance, to include Kabul, which it occupied in deﬁance
of international pressure not to enter the city. On December 6, the Taliban
evacuated the southern city of Kandahar, turning over its last sanctuary to
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opposition forces. Four days later, after only 62 days of conﬂict, the United
States declared victory in Afghanistan.
However, the success of the campaign was marred by two serious mis-
takes, one diplomatic and one military, which would prove to be major
strategic blunders in the War on Terrorism. In mid-November 2001, the
Bush Administration permitted the Pakistani Air Force to ﬂy out hun-
dreds of Pakistanis encircled in the northern city of Konduz, an evacuation
which turned into a mass extraction of senior Taliban and al Qaeda per-
sonnel, dubbed “Operation Evil Airlift” by appalled U.S. Special Forces
personnel on the scene. Then, the following month, the failure to com-
mit U.S. ground forces to block their escape route at Tora Bora permitted
Osama bin Laden and several dozen of his best men to also escape encir-
clement near the border and ﬂee into Pakistan.4 The opportunity to com-
plete the decisive destruction of the Taliban and al Qaeda before Christ-
mas 2001 was lost.
After the withdrawal of the Taliban regime, an interim administration
was quickly installed in Kabul under the terms of the UN-brokered Bonn
Agreement. The temporary government was headed by an ethnic Pash-
tun and CIA contact, Hamid Karzai. Meanwhile, bin Laden and most
of the senior al Qaeda leadership, as well as Taliban leader Mullah Mo-
hammed Omar and the great majority of the senior Taliban cadre, are be-
lieved to have taken up residence either in Pakistan’s Federally Admin-
istered Tribal Areas (FATA) or Baluchistan Province, where they began to
regroup and rearm.
While scattered attacks occurred in Afghanistan during 2002, the se-
curity situation started to deteriorate signiﬁcantly in 2003 in the volatile
south and east of the country. With U.S. forces now bogged down and
overstretched by the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the added strain
of a continuing low-intensity war in Afghanistan became evident. Many
key intelligence, Special Forces, and aviation assets were withdrawn from
Afghanistan and sent to Iraq. Moreover, during this same period, many
Pashtuns became disenchanted with Karzai’s Afghan Transitional Admin-
istration (ATA), which was widely viewed as being controlled by the Pan-
shiri Tajik faction that held the government’s key ministries of defense, in-
terior, and foreign affairs.5 (The situation has now signiﬁcantly reversed,
as many Tajik leaders have been gradually sidelined.) Pashtun suspicions
and mistrust of the government were further heightened by the ATA’s
inability to protect Pashtuns from the wave of human rights abuses per-
petrated by insurgents and warlords since the fall of the Taliban. Finally,
a considerable source of discontent and fuel for the insurgency involved
what were widely seen as the heavy-handed tactics of U.S. military oper-
ations in Pashtun areas of the country.
Despite warnings from the State Department, such “hard-knock” op-
erations continued to be standard procedure for several years, alienating
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much of the populace. The Pentagon continued to view the situation as
one of counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency, and conducted opera-
tions in the rural areas accordingly. As one U.S. Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) commander commented, “Black Ops [Special Operations
counterterrorism forces] do more damage in my province in one night
than I can undo in six months.” Particularly problematic was the careless
use of U.S. air power, which killed scores of civilians, and the apparent
lack of sensitivity by U.S. troops to local perceptions, laws, and customs.
According to reports in the Afghan press, “U.S. Special Forces, during
routine sweeps of Afghan villages searching for weapons and members
of resistance groups, have physically abused villagers, damaged personal
property, and subjected women to body searches, a major affront on a
family’s honor.”6 UN ofﬁcials have commented that “This doesn’t help us
at all . . . the people are basically pro-America. They want U.S. forces to be
here. But American soldiers are not very culturally sensitive. It’s hardly
surprising that Afghans get angry when the Americans turn up and kick
their doors in.”7
By mid-2003, a reemergent Taliban had begun cross-border operations
from Pakistan, posing a growing security threat to eastern and southern
Afghanistan, with the insurgents gradually gaining political control of sig-
niﬁcant portions of the Afghan provinces of Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand,
and Oruzgan. Several NGO workers were murdered by Taliban gueril-
las. In November 2003, 2 years after the Taliban retreat from Kabul, the
United Nations started pulling staff from large areas of southern and east-
ern Afghanistan and closed refugee reception centers in four provinces.8
Unable to provide a reasonable level of security for their personnel,
most NGO’s, including Medicines Sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders),
CARE, and Mercy Corps followed suit. An insurgency that the United
States did not expect and did not understand was now in full swing.
A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
Nearly 300 American Soldiers and Marines have been killed in action
in Afghanistan since October 2001. While the overall level of violence in
Afghanistan does not yet approach that experienced in Iraq, Afghanistan
is actually the more dangerous place to be deployed in terms of fatali-
ties per soldier-day in the combat zone. Furthermore, while the rate of
U.S. casualties has stabilized somewhat in Iraq, it has increased steadily
in Afghanistan since 2002 (see Table 24.1).
Most troubling of all, the last 12 months have provided ample evidence
of increasingly sophisticated insurgent tactics being imported from Iraq
and grafted onto classic mujahideen-style guerilla warfare. In the ﬁrst
5 months of 2006, there was a 200 percent increase in insurgent attacks,
compared to the ﬁrst 5 months of 2005. Indeed, late May 2006 saw the
P1: 000
GGBD088VOL2C24 Forest/C9034 February 28, 2007 16:12
Terrorism, Insurgency, and Afghanistan 457
Table 24.1 U.S. and Coalition Military









200648 64 30 94
2005 99 30 129
2004 52 6 58
2003 48 9 57
2002 48 20 68
2001 12 0 12
Total 323 95 418
deadliest week in the country in 5 years. During the ﬁrst 5 months of
2006, Afghanistan has witnessed numerous attacks consisting of over 50
insurgents, as compared to just one such attack during the same time
period of 2005.9 Reports of insurgents massing in battalion-sized forma-
tions of 300–400 ﬁghters are no longer rare. Lutfullah Mashal, the former
Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman, has recently suggested that: “Tal-
iban ﬁghters no longer rely solely on hit-and-run tactics by small groups
of guerrillas. Instead, the Taliban have been concentrating into groups of
more than 100 ﬁghters to carry out frontal assaults on government security
posts.”10 Some analysts believe that the Taliban have at least 12,000 ﬁght-
ers controlling areas in the provinces of Oruzgan, Helmand, Zabol and
Kandahar.11
Extremely troubling indicators—such as the relatively free movement
of insurgent groups—reveal that increasingly large areas of the east and
south of the country are falling under the political control of the Tal-
iban. Said Jawad, Afghanistan’s ambassador to the United States, re-
cently stated, “We have lost a lot of the ground that we may have gained
in the country, especially in the South . . . The fact that U.S. military re-
sources have been ‘diverted’ to the war in Iraq is of course hurting
Afghanistan.”12
Taliban insurgents and their al Qaeda allies are undoubtedly gaining
strength. There have been numerous attacks in recent months in areas
other than the south and east, suggesting that the Taliban has expanded
the scope of its operations and has begun to “take the war to the North.”
Cross-border operations from Pakistan are commonplace. The implica-
tions of the escalating violence in Afghanistan are now compounded by
the fact that the United States, which has been responsible for the bulk of
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan since the beginning of OEF, is in
the process of ceding operational control of the war to NATO forces.13
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THE BORDER PROBLEM
For decades, nearly all of Afghanistan’s neighboring states have pro-
duced disenchanted groups of Uyghurs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other Is-
lamists who have used Afghanistan for guerrilla training and an area from
which to pursue their violent agendas. While such groups have played a
role in Afghanistan, the most important foreign actors in Afghanistan’s
affairs have come from Pakistan’s western border provinces, Northwest
Frontier (NWFP) and Baluchistan, and especially the Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan today has become an attractive base
for terrorists and extremists. The government of Pakistan, for its part,
has long sought to exert inﬂuence in Afghanistan, because of its desire
for “strategic depth” on its northern border in the event of any con-
ﬂict with India. Successive Pakistani governments have promoted Islamic
radicalism to subvert Pashtun and Baluch nationalist movements and
to further their ambitions in Afghanistan and Kashmir, through groups
such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Jamiat Ulema-
i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), and
Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF). Jihad, drugs, and gunrunning have long been
the main sources of livelihood for many of the Pashtuns living near
the ill-deﬁned border. Afghan refugee camps and thousands of Islamist
madrasas opened by the JUI provide a steady ﬂow of recruits for the Tal-
iban and other radical groups.
The minimal U.S. troop presence in the south has ensured that
the rugged and porous 2,450 kilometer border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan does not even constitute a speed bump to extremist groups
such as the Taliban and al Qaeda seeking to expand their networks of
support and increase their inﬂuence among the Pashtun tribesmen in
Afghanistan. By mid-2005, in the strategically vital border province of
Paktika, for example—which has a population of some 600,000 people and
shares a 400 km border with Pakistan—the United States had only two
companies of light infantry, and no engineers or aviation assets. Special
Forces teams were drawn down. And in the summer of 2005, the ﬂedgling
Provincial Reconstruction Team (or PRT) in Paktika was dismembered
due to personnel shortages, and its minimal Civil Affairs remnant (the
Civil-Military Operations Center, or CMOC) was colocated with a maneu-
ver company, a devolution that has been repeated at seven other U.S.-led
PRTs, once hailed as the cornerstone of reconstruction and security.
Afghanistan’s President Karzai and his new foreign minister, Rangin
Dadfar Spanta, have recently blamed Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISID) for Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. Kabul rightly claims
that Pakistani security forces chase al Qaeda terrorists within Pakistan
but do not make any signiﬁcant effort to arrest Taliban ﬁghters or stop
them from crossing the border into Afghanistan.14 Indeed, the coalition of
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Islamist political parties, which completely dominates the border region
and represents it in Parliament, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (or MMA—
dubbed by wags in Islamabad as the “Mullah-Musharraf Alliance”) is
openly pro-Taliban. This lack of cooperation by Pakistan and the open de-
ﬁance of the MMA have been extremely frustrating for the United States.
As Henry A. Crumpton, the American coordinator for counterterrorism,
asserts:
. . . the Americans are ﬁnding the Pakistanis much more reluctant to face
down the Taliban—who are brethren from the Pashtun ethnic group that
dominates in Afghanistan—than they have been to confront al Qaida, who
are largely outsiders. “Has Pakistan done enough? I think the answer is
no. . . .Not only al Qaida, but Taliban leadership are primarily in Pakistan,
and the Pakistanis know that.”15
In 2004, after negotiating with the Pashtun tribal Maliks (essentially
spokesmen, as the Pashtun recognize no chieftains), Pakistan responded
to U.S. pressure with an unprecedented deployment of a reported 70,000
troops to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. In Baluchistan, this force
was led by the Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps and regular army
elements from the Pakistan’s 12th Corps. The Pakistani campaign in the
FATA, especially in the North and South Waziristan Agencies, is be-
ing conducted by a battalion-plus Special Operations Task Force (SOTF),
along with elements of the Pakistani Army’s 11th Corps, aided by the in-
digenous local Scouts units of the Frontier Corps. While such Pakistani
troop levels greatly exceed the total number of U.S and coalition forces in
Afghanistan, the actual relationship between the Pakistani campaign and
the U.S. GWOT is controversial and unclear, as suggested by Pakistan’s
Gen Tariq Majid, the Pakistani army’s chief of general staff:
We are not ﬁghting America’s war in the FATA. It is in our own interest.
We’re ﬁghting this war because, unfortunately, there have been fallout effects
in Pakistan from the instability in Afghanistan.16
Indeed, the Pakistani military activity has been aimed, for domestic polit-
ical reasons, almost entirely at “foreign elements,” meaning primarily for-
mer mujahideen from Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries who
settled in northern Pakistan after the Soviet-Afghan War—not the Taliban
or its network of supporters in the MMA.
While the perceived threat from India and fear of a two-front war has
shaped Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan, the desire for “strate-
gic depth” is not the only driver of Pakistan’s foreign policy toward
Afghanistan. Afghanistan has also been inﬂuenced by Pakistan’s strat-
egy toward India-controlled Kashmir. One veteran Pakistani observer
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suggests that: “the Kashmir issue became the prime mover behind
Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its support to the Taliban.”17 Camps in
Afghanistan created for training Afghan Arabs during the anti-Soviet ji-
had have been recycled to train guerrilla forces for ﬁghting in Kashmir.
Pakistan has used these jihadi forces as a bargaining chip with India in
an attempt to gain more autonomy and even independence from India for
Kashmir.
IRAQ AND JIHADI NETWORKS
A new source of concern is the fact that recent insurgent attacks—
including the introduction of suicide bombings and the use of improvised
explosive devises (IEDs)—have demonstrated an unusual level of internal
coordination and a growing technological sophistication in the Afghan
insurgency imported from outside the Pashtun belt. Since the summer
of 2004, a variety of guerilla tactics (including assassinations and kid-
nappings) in Afghanistan18 and numerous reports of knowledge transfer
indicate that the insurgents are importing tactics and lethal technology
from Iraq.19 In the ﬁrst 6 months of 2006, Afghan insurgents set off 32
suicide bombs, six more than in all of 2005.20 As Griff Whitte wrote in
the Washington Post, “despite a quarter-century of war, [suicide attacks]
in Afghanistan have historically been relatively rare because of a cultural
aversion to suicide.”21 According to international security analysis Esther
Pan, “Suicide is not a characteristic tactic of the Afghan people . . . they
have a cultural aversion to it.”22 Only ﬁve suicide attacks—none of which
targeted civilians—were reported during the ﬁrst 31/2 years after the Tal-
iban were driven from power. The great majority of the suicide attacks
carried out during the last 11/2 years appear to have been “outsourced”
to non-Afghans, most often to Punjabis from the south of Pakistan and
young foreign Islamists recruited from radical groups in the Middle
East.
In summary, the wild and largely unregulated tribal areas on Pakistan’s
northern border play an extremely important role in the Afghan insur-
gency, as well as in the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir and the rising
internal unrest that challenges both Pakistani security forces and gov-
ernmental authority all along the frontier. They provide a steady source
of recruits, a safe haven for senior leadership, and a base of operations
and training for the Taliban, its al Qaeda afﬁliates, and (to a lesser de-
gree) the Hekmatyar faction of Hizb-i-Islami (HiG).23 Nonindigenous tac-
tics and imported technologies indicate both al Qaeda facilitation of Ji-
hadi networks for information-sharing and growing insurgent use of the
Internet as a means of distributing lethal knowledge. The next section of
this chapter will assess the Taliban and HiG insurgent groups in greater
detail.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN
“A host of wandering Talib-ul-ilums, who correspond with the theological
students in Turkey and live free at the expense of the people . . . ”
—Winston Churchill, 189824
Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan deteriorated into a
brutal civil war between rival mujahideen groups positioning for power.25
This civil war claimed thousands of lives and decimated what remained of
the country’s infrastructure. The civil war intensiﬁed after one of the mu-
jahideen groups took Kabul on April 25, 1992. Shortly afterward, Beirut-
style street ﬁghting erupted in the city, especially between the Pashtun
Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Tajik Jamaat-i-Islam of
Barhannudin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud. This civil war, fought
with the vast surpluses of ordnance left over from the covert anti-Soviet
military aid program and huge stockpiles of heavy weapons abandoned
by the retreating Russians, eventually wreaked as much—if not more—
havoc and destruction on the country as had the Soviet invasion and oc-
cupation. Kabul, which had remained virtually untouched during the war,
was savagely bombarded with rockets, mortars, and artillery by Gulbud-
din Hekmatyar. In Kandahar, ﬁghting between Islamists—led by HiG—
and traditionalist mujahideen parties resulted in the destruction of much
of the traditional Kandahari societal power structures. In the rural areas,
warlords, drug lords, and bandits ran amok in a state of anarchy acceler-
ated by the unraveling of the traditional tribal leadership system.
As the mujahideen factions and warlords were ﬁghting amongst them-
selves for power in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s leading Islamist party, the JUI,
built a network of religious boarding schools throughout northern Pak-
istan to extend the inﬂuence of the indigenous Deobandi School of Islamic
thought, an investment that itself provides an insight into their temporal
horizons. These madrasas were soon providing an important educational
alternative for the numerous displaced refugees from the anti-Soviet jihad
and the Afghan civil war, as well as for poor families along the frontier
unable to afford the costs and fees of the secular schools. (Today there are
some 5,900 madrasas in operation in NWFP and the FATA alone, with an
estimated 600,000 students studying curricula neither approved nor ob-
served by educational authorities in Pakistan.)
With the oversight of the ISID, who had grown weary of their
favorite Afghan mujahideen leader—Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—the Tal-
iban emerged from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and FATA
madrasas and the kinship networks inside the remaining Afghan refugee
camps. The Taliban arrived on the Afghan scene in 1994 with little warn-
ing, and vowed to install a traditional Islamic government in Afghanistan
and end the carnage of the ﬁghting among the warlords. With massive
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covert assistance from the Pakistani ISID, Army, and Air Force, the
Taliban overthrew the largely Tajik (and northern) mujahideen regime in
Kabul, capturing the capital in September 1996. The country the Taliban
captured soon became a training ground for Islamic activists and other
radicals from the Middle East and around Asia.
The war-weary Afghans initially welcomed the Taliban, because they
believed that they would bring peace and stability to their ravaged coun-
try. The Taliban promoted itself as a new force for honesty and unity, and
many Afghans—particularly fellow Pashtuns—supported the Taliban in
hopes of respite from years of war, anarchy, and corruption. The Taliban
went after the warlords responsible for the anarchy, and Afghans initially
ﬂocked to their movement. Soon after gaining control of Kabul, however,
the Taliban instituted and employed a religious police force, the Amr Bil
Marof Wa Nai An Munkir (Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice)
to brutally uphold their extreme and often bizarre interpretations of Islam
(which were not previously known in Afghanistan). The Taliban philoso-
phy, Ahmed Rashid notes,
ﬁtted nowhere in the Islamic spectrum of ideas and movements that
had emerged in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1994. . . . The Taliban rep-
resented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except
their own. . . . Before the Taliban, Islamic extremism had never ﬂourished in
Afghanistan.26
The initial optimism of the Afghan people soon turned to fear, as the Tal-
iban introduced a draconian interpretation of sharia law, banned women
from work, and introduced sadistic punishments that included amputa-
tions and death by stoning.
Tajik resistance to the Taliban in the form of the Northern Alliance held
out throughout the Taliban period and retained Afghanistan’s seat in the
United Nations, but were steadily pushed back by a series of military de-
feats into the extreme northeast province of Badakshan. Just as the Taliban
assassinated Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud and were
poised to wipe out them out completely, however, the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 unfolded in the United States. These events, of course,
led to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and the initiation of OEF on Octo-
ber 7, 2001.27
THE TRIBAL BASIS OF THE TALIBAN
Western military analysts have consistently misinterpreted the Taliban
as everything from a simple fundamentalist Islamic movement to a
criminal gang. In reality, the Taliban is a social phenomenon with a tribal
chassis. Its religious dimension—an extreme interpretation of Deobandi
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Table 24.2 Senior Taliban Leaders
Name Position Tribal Afﬁliation
Mullah Muhammad Omar Movement Leader Hotaki Ghilzai
Mullah Berader Deputy Movement Leader Ghilzai
Mullah Dadullah Kakar Senior Military
Commander
Kakar Ghurgusht
Mullah Mohammad Hassan Foreign Minister after 1997 Hotaki Ghilzai
Nuruddin Turabi Minister of Justice Hotaki Ghilzai
Alla Dad Akhund Minister of
Communications
Hotaki Ghilzai
Mohamed Essa Minister of Water and
Power
Hotaki Ghilzai
Wakil Ahmed Personal Secretary to
Mullah Omar
Kakar Ghurgusht
Sadeq Akhond Minister of Commerce Hotaki Ghilzai
Mohammed Rabbani Chairman of Kabul Shura Kakar Ghurgusht
Mullah Obaidullah Minister of Defense Hotaki Ghilzai
thought—is just the steering wheel. The Taliban consists entirely of rural
Pashtuns, the great majority of them from the Ghilzai tribal group, with
some support from the Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht nation. More
speciﬁcally, however, although the Taliban eventually coopted other
Pashtun leaders, Mullah Omar, and most of the senior members of the
Taliban from 1996-2001 were from the Hotaki tribe of the Ghilzais, as
shown in Table 24.2.
The strength of the Ghilzais today is a direct result of the Soviet-Afghan
War, during which they led three of the seven ofﬁcially recognized Mu-
jahideen groups who received massive covert military and ﬁnancial sup-
port. This assistance fundamentally altered the balance of Pashtun power
between the Ghilzais and their sworn enemies, the Durranis, who led none
of the seven and who were deliberately sidelined by the CIA and ISID.
This tribal “genetic meddling” quickly came home to roost in Afghanistan
in the form of the Ghilzai Taliban.
The Taliban is, at its heart, all about tribal politics. It represents a tribal
power grab by Ghilzais, made possible by an order of magnitude jump
in military power during the Soviet-Afghan War. The Ghilzais have his-
torically been in conﬂict with the Durrani confederation of tribes, who
have held political power in Kabul for most of the last 300 years (Presi-
dent Karzai and King Zahir Shah are Durranis.) Kandahar and Helmand
provinces are Durrani lands, while the Ghilzai are concentrated in Oruz-
gan, Zabol, Dai Kundi, and Gardez provinces and the Katawaz region
of Paktika province. In keeping with their extreme Deobandi philosophy,
the Taliban are vehemently opposed to any hierarchical structure within
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Islamic society, which dovetails neatly into their hatred of the Durranis,
who have always provided Afghanistan’s kings. Thus, the ﬁrst instinct of
the Taliban today, as in 1994, is not to drive directly on Kabul, but rather to
subjugate and coopt the Durranis, which explains why most Taliban mil-
itary activity today is in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, not further
north and east toward Kabul. Only when the tribal grievances have been
settled and their tribal ﬂanks are secure will the Taliban move toward the
capital, as they did in 1996. It also explains why, in 1996, when the Ghilzai
Taliban came to power in Kabul, they did not invite the Durrani Pashtun
King, Zahir Shah, back to Afghanistan, which was one of the ﬁrst orders
of business of the Bonn Agreement.
The importance of the Ghilzai to the Taliban insurgency is illustrated by-
Figure 24.1. The shaded sections of the map of Afghanistan in Figure 24.1
represent those areas politically controlled by the Taliban as of this writ-
ing in May 2006 (with many other areas signiﬁcantly contested). These
areas include the northern districts of Kandahar Province, the northeast-
ern districts of Helmand Province, most of Oruzgan and Zabol Provinces,
and districts in Paktika, Ghazni, Wardak, and Logar Provinces. The in-
set map in Figure 24.1 represents a rough sketch of the tribal areas of the
Durrani, Ghilzai, Ghurgusht, Karlanri, and Sarbani—the ﬁve large tribal
confederations of Pashtuns. If one compares the inset of the tribal areas in
Afghanistan with the large swath of Taliban political control, it is evident
that the most intense area of the insurgency today is the area dominated
by the various Ghilzai tribes.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE TALIBAN
While the tribal politics are important, however, they do not explain
how the Taliban was able to mobilize socially so effectively, even with
massive Pakistani support. To do this, it drew unconsciously on a univer-
sally understood cultural phenomenon among the frontier Pashtun, one
which the British and later the Pakistani governments encountered over
and over again: the charismatic Mullah movement. Mullah Mohammed
Omar Akhund is the archetype of this charismatic Mullah phenomenon,
a cyclical pattern of insurrection that manifests itself about every 30 years
in the Pashtun belt. Indeed, such leaders have often gained powers on the
frontier during times of social distress.28 These charismatic uprisings were
so common, in fact, the British dubbed them “Mad Mullah movements.”
There have been many. A similar ﬁgure to Mullah Omar, Mirza Ali
Khan—a Tori Khel Waziri who was known to the West as the Fakir of Ipi—
led ﬁrst British and then Pakistani security forces on a frustrating chase
around the frontier for 30 years.29 Protected by his Pashtun tribal support-
ers in the hills, much as Mullah Omar is today, he was never caught. The
Mullah of Hadda, as noted by David Edwards in “Heroes of the Age,”
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provoked the Great Pashtun Revolt of 1897 through mysticism, parlor
tricks, and promises to turn British bullets to water.30 In “Resistance
and Control in Pakistan,” Akbar Ahmed focuses on the emergence of a
charismatic Mullah in Waziristan who, like Mullah Omar, challenged state
legitimacy.31 Ahmed argues that the Mullah of Waziristan also used mys-
ticism to gain legitimacy, much like Mullah Omar did 30 years later, and
challenged Pakistan’s attempt to modernize FATA.
Omar joined this rogues gallery of politicized insurgent Mullahs by
means of a politico-religious stunt that is of enormous importance to the
Taliban movement but that is considered insigniﬁcant by most Western
analysts, if they are aware of it at all. In so doing, he became the epitome
of the charismatic leader as described by Max Weber, who he deﬁned as
having:
. . . a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set
apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, super-
human, or at least speciﬁcally exceptional powers or qualities. These are such
as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine ori-
gin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is
treated as a leader . . . 32
The event in question was Omar’s removal in 1994 of a sacred garment—
believed by many Afghans to be the original cloak worn by the Prophet
Mohammed—from its sanctuary in Kandahar, and actually wearing it
while standing atop a mosque in the city. Whereas Omar had been a
nonentity before this piece of religious theatre, the audacious stunt cat-
apulted him to a level of mystical power (at least among the 90 percent
of Pashtuns who are illiterate) in a manner that is almost impossible for
Westerners to understand, and it resulted in his being proclaimed locally
the Amir-ul Momineen, the Leader of the Faithful—not just of the Afghans
but of all Muslims.33
What is known of the Taliban subsequent to this event conforms exactly
to the pattern of social mobilization observed and documented as the
insurgent “Mad Mullah” phenomenon. Furthermore, once in power,
Ahmed Rashid notes that Taliban power was (and is) concentrated
exclusively in the person of Mullah Omar, another characteristic of the
phenomenon—and contrary to traditional Pashtun shura (consensus)
politics. As Rashid has observed, Omar ultimately made all the decisions
within the Taliban, and no one dared act without his orders.34 Today,
Mullah Omar issues statements of encouragement to his ﬁeld comman-
ders, rather than operational orders, exactly as did the Mullah of Hadda
as described by David Edwards.35 Thus, unlike most insurgencies, which
are not centered in the personality of a single leader, the Taliban’s center
of gravity, in Clausewitzian terms, is not Taliban foot soldiers or ﬁeld
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commanders or even the senior clerics around Omar. It is Omar himself.
Because it is, socially, a charismatic movement, if Mullah Omar dies, the
Taliban, at least in its current incarnation, will wither and die, because
he alone is the Leader of the Faithful. It is not a question of political or
military succession: The mystical charismatic power in Islam that came
from wearing the Cloak of the Prophet is not something transferable to a
second in command. Unfortunately, because this entire phenomenon is so
alien to Western thinking, U.S. observers and analysts have tended almost
universally instead to interpret the Taliban in terms more compatible with
Western logic and thought.
It is thus a strategic error, we believe, to label the Taliban as an “Islamist
fundamentalist movement,” or a drug gang, or any of the other revolv-
ing door euphemisms applied to it, such as “Anti-Government Militia.”
Understanding the Taliban enemy more precisely could enable better in-
formation and psychological operations, for example, or a more nuanced
understanding of the human terrain by U.S. and NATO forces, and would
suggest a realignment of reconstruction priorities based on historical mod-
els to isolate the movement and prevent its further mobilization.
HEKMATYAR AND HIZB-i-ISLAMI (HiG)
On February 19, 2003, the United States designated Gulbuddin Hekmat-
yar a “specially designated global terrorist.”36 Hekmatyar is a prominent
member of the American “most wanted terrorist list,” behind only bin
Laden, Mullah Omar, and (until his death in 2006) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Hekmatyar is a seasoned veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war and has been
described as “comparably wealthy, ruthless, arrogant, inﬂexible, [and] a
stern disciplinarian.”37
Hekmatyar’s mujahideen faction, the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, was
one of the major resistance groups ﬁghting the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. The HiG received the largest share of the arms and funds
that came into Afghanistan from Arab and Western countries to ﬁght the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was the favorite party of Pakistan’s
ISID during and immediately after the Soviet-Afghan war—and, as noted
earlier, was responsible for much of the death and destruction that fol-
lowed the collapse of communist rule in 1992. Hekmatyar has repeat-
edly called for a jihad38 against the coalition forces in Afghanistan and
those who cooperate with them—including the current Karzai govern-
ment. Although his wanton destruction of much of Kabul by indiscrim-
inate shelling of the city cost him any support he might still have had
within Afghanistan, his call for the establishment of a pure Islamic state
in Afghanistan and his condemnation of what he views as the corrupting
inﬂuence of the West retains some residual appeal in northwest Pakistan.
And he still has powerful friends within the ISID.
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Hekmatyar is a Ghilzai Pashtun of the Kharoti tribe. His family, how-
ever, was one of thousands of Pashtun families who were forcefully re-
located to northern Afghanistan as part of “detribalization” efforts early
in the twentieth century, and he is thus less able to draw on traditional
kinship networks within the Kharotis of the south today. During the late
1960s, while Hekmatyar was studying at the Faculty of Engineering at
Kabul University, he was introduced to radical politics. After a brief pe-
riod of involvement with Afghan communists, he became a disciple of
Sayyid Qutb and the Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) move-
ment. Ever since, he has been one of the most outspoken and extreme
of all Afghan leaders. He was known, for example, to patrol the bazaars
of Kabul with vials of acid, which he would throw in the face of any
woman who dared to walk outdoors without a full burka covering her
face. His insurgency movement is built on the Ikhwan model of Islamic
revolution, which stresses the establishment of a pure Islamic state and
utilizes a highly disciplined organizational structure built around a small
cadre of educated elites over which Hekmatyar retains strict control. It is
thus closer to the foco model of Marxist revolution than the charismatic
and purely rural Taliban movement, but both are essentially insurgencies
built on the personalities of their leaders rather than on sustainable mass
popular support.
In 1994, with support of the ISID, Hekmatyar started training for-
eign volunteers to support Pakistan’s new covert jihad in Indian-held
Kashmir.39 Pakistan decided to “out-source” the jihad in Kashmir; as a
result, Hekmatyar became a major focus of this effort. In a move to in-
crease its base of support, the Rabbani government in Kabul invited Hek-
matyar to join the government, an offer that he accepted, brieﬂy, twice.
However, his overwhelming unpopularity backﬁred on Rabbani, whose
government lost large tracts of popular support as a result of its associa-
tion with the Butcher of Kabul, rather than gaining in strength. When it
later became clear that not only was Hekmatyar not achieving Pakistan’s
goals in Jammu and Kashmir, but also that his lack of popular support
in Afghanistan ensured that he would remain a marginalized loser in
any future Afghan state, the new Pakistani government of Benazir Bhutto
switched its support and helped to organize the Taliban movement. De-
spite having similar goals in the establishment of a pure Islamic state in
Afghanistan and a common Ghilzai ethnicity, Hekmatyar was a bitter en-
emy during the Taliban’s initial reigning years. In his educated, elitist
urban worldview, the illiterate rural Mullahs of the Taliban are hillbilly
bumpkins, and he regards them with a thinly veiled contempt for their
lack of learning and sophistication. There are also important differences
between his vision of an Islamic state and the grotesquely distorted trav-
esty of Deobandi thought of Mullah Omar. Hekmatyar’s forces fought the
Taliban until they ousted him from his power base around Jalalabad, after
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which he ﬂed to Iran for a period before returning to Afghanistan in early
2002. Despite residual animosities, however, on the principle that “the en-
emy of my enemy is my friend”—at least temporarily—he has recently ne-
gotiated a truce with the Taliban and an agreement on limited cooperation
in destroying the government of Hamid Karzai. It may not be too great of
a stretch to imagine the hidden hand of the ISID behind this de´tente.
His forces today operate in Konduz, Nangarhar, and Nuristan
provinces, and he has been linked to numerous attacks on U.S. and Inter-
national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel, as well as to many
other attacks against Afghan government and security elements.40 The
few brief contacts that U.S. forces have had with the remote tribal groups
of Nuristan since 2001 have provided strong evidence that HiG is using
the virtually inaccessible valleys of that isolated region for training and
logistics basing. The Nuristanis, for their part, want nothing to do with
Hekmatyar’s Ghilzais, and have requested a U.S. PRT be established in
Nuristan province, a request that U.S. authorities have declined for rea-
sons unknown. HiG remains a dangerous and sometimes deadly guerilla
opponent in the southeast, which has impeded both Afghan government
efforts to consolidate control in the region, and international efforts to re-
build and develop it, but his personal inability to inspire and mobilize
mass popular support suggest his insurgency will be unable to generate
critical mass. As with the Taliban, if the leader of HiG were to be liqui-
dated, his movement, based as it is on the iron will of one man to gain
power, would quickly wither and die with him, as did, for example, the
Sendero Luminoso movement in Peru after the capture of Abimael Guzman
in 1992.41
POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RISE OF THE
TALIBAN PHOENIX42
Afghanistan today is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of in-
surgency, terrorism, narcotics,43 and warlords. The nexus between them is
growing and self-reinforcing. Five years of benign neglect by the United
States after the installation of Hamid Karzai as President have brought
Afghanistan back to the brink of state failure. Since 2001, Washington
has badly shortchanged Afghanistan in men and resources. The deploy-
ment of U.S. and ISAF forces44 to the stabilization of the countryside rep-
resented the lowest per capita commitment of peacekeeping personnel to
any postconﬂict environment since the end of World War II. The ratios of
peacekeepers to citizens in the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, for exam-
ple, were 1:48 and 1:58 respectively. For the ﬁrst 3 years in Afghanistan,
the comparable ﬁgure hovered near 1:2,000. Today, with an increase in
U.S. force levels and a major reinforcement of the NATO ISAF mission, it
is roughly one peacekeeper to every 1,000 Afghans (1: 1000).
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The number of security force personnel deployed after Bonn was com-
pletely inadequate to ﬁll the security vacuum left by the retreating Tal-
iban, a void that was quickly ﬁlled by warlords and drug lords, many of
whom have since donned national police uniforms to facilitate narcotics
trafﬁcking.45 As bad as they are, however, the numbers alone do not tell
the whole story. As noted previously, the bulk of the Special Forces sol-
diers who best understand counterinsurgency, for example, were soon
pulled out of Afghanistan to serve in Iraq and elsewhere. Aviation assets
have also been drawn down to minimal levels. Because of the lack of heli-
copter assets, “Quick Reaction Forces” throughout much of the south are
forced to respond to the scene of minor Taliban attacks in Humvees. With
an average overland speed of 5–10 miles an hour (over rocky trails that
have not improved), Taliban guerillas are usually long gone from their
“roadblock and run” attacks before U.S. forces arrive, which emboldens
the insurgents, demonstrates our inability to protect the locals, and de-
moralizes the police, few of whom are willing to try to hold off hardened
and heavily armed Taliban veterans for several hours with poor quality
weapons and the standard 30-rounds of issued ammunition.
Even more damaging to the effort to stabilize Afghanistan after the fall
of the Taliban was the shockingly low level of funding committed to re-
build a country laid waste by 25 years of war. Astonishingly, President
Karzai was in ofﬁce nearly 3 years before total U.S. reconstruction spend-
ing in Afghanistan reached $1 billion. During the same period, the cost
of military operations in Afghanistan was approximately $36 billion, per-
haps one of history’s most glaring illustrations of being “penny wise and
pound foolish.” Not counting the repaving of the Kabul-Kandahar high-
way, U.S. aid to Afghanistan over the last 5 years has averaged just $13
per Afghan per year. Nor, despite clear and disturbing evidence that the
lack of reconstruction funds is largely responsible for the rapid spread
of Taliban inﬂuence in the south since 2002, has the level of this aid to
Afghanistan increased; in fact, it has decreased since 2004. The total U.S.-
aid budget for the entire country in ﬁscal year 2006 is roughly $700 million,
equal to the cost of operating the war in Iraq for only 36 hours. Total U.S.
spending since 9/11 to rebuild an entire nation almost exactly the size of
Texas amounts to less than half the cost of rebuilding just the levees in
New Orleans damaged by Hurricane Katrina.
On the ground, frequent turnovers of personnel, lack of local funds, a
cumbersome, Bagram-driven approval process for projects, the absence of
eyes-on construction oversight and quality control, inadequate vetting of
contractors, and endemic corruption of Afghan ofﬁcials has combined to
waste much of what was spent. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
effort has provided an interesting laboratory for U.S. Army Civil Affairs
experimentation, but their numbers are absurdly inadequate. With an ap-
proximate overall troop-to-task ratio of one PRT (in Pashtun areas) for
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every one million Pashtuns, the strategic impact of their presence is negli-
gible. In lawless Paktika Province in 2005, for example, where no NGOs or
IOs will operate, a total of eight American civil affairs enlisted reservists
and two inexperienced mid-career transfer civil affairs ofﬁcers were re-
sponsible for all rural development and reconstruction projects in an area
the size of Vermont and New Hampshire combined, with a population of
600,000 people, where living conditions are largely unchanged since bib-
lical times.
With a miniscule Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
budget, what any ten soldiers can accomplish in this environment
amounts at best to a few grains of sand on the beach. In 2005, the en-
tire province of Paktika had only a handful of buildings not made of
adobe, fewer than a dozen high school graduates, and no telephones or
paved roads anywhere within its borders. There were two antiquated clin-
ics (charitably called “hospitals”) and two doctors. Ofﬁcially, the province
has 352 elementary schools for boys, but only 40 actual school buildings.
The remainder of the “schools” are simply patches of open ground in the
village where the 6th-graders teach what they know to the 1st graders.
Few, if any, girls attend school at all. How ten civil affairs personnel with
three Humvees and a few hundred thousand dollars are supposed to
change this is unclear. In fact, in the ﬁrst 4 years of the Karzai govern-
ment, the U.S. government had not built a single school or clinic any-
where in Paktika Province. To make matters worse, as noted previously,
due to manpower shortages, the PRTs in Paktika and seven other loca-
tions have now been effectively disbanded, with their support elements
redeployed to other duties. Further, the handful of Civil Affairs soldiers
of the Civil Military Operations Centers (the CMOCs) have been rolled to-
gether with combat maneuver elements onto shared ﬁrebases, where they
are generally the lowest priority for missions and assets. In these cases, the
PRTs—originally designed as independent, freestanding civil-military af-
fairs institutions—no longer exist as such. The stated mission of the PRT,
to “extend the reach of the Afghan national government to the rural ar-
eas” is itself a gem of Kafkaesque spin, because as of 2005 there were no
Afghans at all on any PRT. While there is coordination with the Afghan
government at the provincial planning level, when PRTs go “outside the
wire,” they almost always do so alone. Hence, at the district or village
level, their presence lacks any Afghan government component that might
extend its reach. The failure of the minimalist peacekeeping and recon-
struction efforts to ensure rural security and effect any meaningful im-
provement in the lives of the people in the rural south has created an an-
gry environment of unfulﬁlled expectations. As much as (or more than)
the Karzai government’s inability to extend its authority beyond Kabul,
this gap between expectation and reality is what has opened the door to
the resurgence of the Taliban.
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ASSESSING THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY AND COALITION
COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS
The Taliban intuitively understood that the center of gravity was the
satisfaction of the rural Pashtun with the results of the new government
in Kabul. They knew there was a window of opportunity for Karzai to
gain rural Pashtun support, and they were quick to capitalize on the fail-
ure of the Department of Defense to understand this paradigm. Indeed,
the DOD saw the aftermath of the Taliban’s withdrawal south of the bor-
der as a simple matter of subtractive math: “Kill the existing terrorists
until the number reaches zero and the war is over.” For the ﬁrst 2 years
of the insurgency, the DOD maintained a paradigm of “mopping up” and
“hunting down” the “remaining bitter-enders.”
For its part, the Taliban today is conducting a clever defensive insur-
gency at the operational level of war. They have deployed a sufﬁcient
number of low-level ﬁghters to intimidate the NGOs and IGOs—who
would normally carry out most of the reconstruction—into withdrawing
all of their personnel from the south. By night, Taliban Mullahs travel in
the rural areas, speaking to village elders. They are fond of saying, “the
Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time.” The simple
message they deliver in person or by “night letter” is one of intimida-
tion: “The Americans may stay for ﬁve years, they may stay for ten, but
eventually they will leave, and when they do, we will come back to this
village and kill every family that has collaborated with the Americans or
the Karzai government.” Such a message is devastatingly effective in these
areas, where transgenerational feuds and revenge are part of the fabric of
society.
The combination of the lack of local protection from the Taliban’s
nightly visits and the absence of any tangible reason to support either the
Americans or Karzai are reason enough for the villagers to either remain
neutral or provide assistance to the guerillas. But as noted previously,
American forces have often accelerated the alienation through culturally
obtuse behavior, unnecessarily invasive and violent tactics, and a series of
tragic incidents of “collateral damage,” which are inevitable in wartime.
U.S. forces deploying to Afghanistan still receive only minimal “cultural
awareness” brieﬁngs, if any, and this training is usually the lowest prior-
ity on the checklist of requirements to be crossed off before deployment,
sandwiched between the night navigation course and the grenade range.
Few, if any, can speak a word of the Pashto language, and thus rely on pri-
marily young, trilingual Tajik interpreters to communicate with Pashtun
elders, itself often a source of friction.
At the strategic level of war, the Taliban is ﬁghting a classic “war of
the ﬂea,” largely (and unsurprisingly) along much the same lines used
by the mujahideen 20 years ago against the Soviets, including ﬁghting
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in villages to deliberately provoke airstrikes and collateral damage.46 In
the latest in a long series of such incidents, in May 2006, U.S. airstrikes
killed as many as 40 civilians in Panjway District of Kandahar Province.
The United States views this as the tragic but bearable cost of a successful
operation against the insurgents, without understanding that the Taliban
has deliberately traded the lives of a few dozen guerilla ﬁghters in order
to cost the American forces the permanent loyalty of that village, under a
code of Pashtun social behavior called Pashtunwali and its obligation for
revenge (Badal), which the Army does not even begin to understand or
take seriously.
Indeed, the United States continues to ﬁght the war largely according
to the Taliban “game plan.” The priority of American effort is still what
the Taliban wants it to be, the so-called “kill/capture mission,” and the
U.S. Army spends much of its time on battalion-sized or larger sweep op-
erations. In June, 2006, the United States led approximately 10,000 coali-
tion forces in yet another large-scale sweep operation, dubbed “Operation
Mountain Thrust,” in another massive demonstration of failed Vietnam-
era counterinsurgency tactics designed to “ﬂush out” Taliban guerillas,
most of whom simply hide until the sweep has passed by and coalition
forces have left the area before resuming their activities. This plays right
into the Taliban’s operational goal, which is to get American forces to do
exactly what they are doing: alienating rural villages with invasive tac-
tics, and pouring the manpower, equipment, and ﬁscal resources—which
should be focused on improving people’s lives instead—into chasing il-
literate and expendable teenage boys with guns around the countryside
like the proverbial dog chasing its tail and gnawing at individual ﬂea
bites.
Although few (if any) insurgencies have ever been won by killing insur-
gents, this still remains the primary strategy in Afghanistan. News reports
of ﬁghting in southern Afghanistan are increasingly dominated by Taliban
body counts eerily reminiscent of Vietnam-era reporting. And ironically,
Afghanistan is probably the country where this failed strategy of focus-
ing on the “kill/capture mission” is least likely to work. The Taliban has
a virtually inﬁnite number of guerilla recruits growing up in the Pashtun-
Afghan refugee camps in northern Pakistan and pouring out of the De-
obandi madrasas along the border, and could sustain casualties of 10,000
or more guerillas a year for 20 years without any operational impact. In-
deed, the Pashtun, who make up 100 percent of the Taliban, have a saying:
“Kill one enemy, make ten.” Thus, the death in battle of a Pashtun guerilla
invokes an obligation of revenge among all his male relatives, making the
killing of a Taliban guerilla an act of insurgent multiplication, not subtrac-
tion. The Soviets learned this lesson the hard way. They killed nearly a
million Pashtuns, and the effect this level of genocide had on the number
of Pashtun guerillas in the ﬁeld was that it increased it.
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Indeed, as an understanding of the true nature of the Taliban as a charis-
matic religious cult movement typical in Frontier history suggests, the
Taliban center of gravity is Mullah Omar, the charismatic cult leader, not
teenage boys or mid-level commanders, and no amount of killing them
will shut the insurgency down. In the meantime, the United States is
losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village at a time, failing to
rebuild the countryside, bursting into schoolyards full of children with
guns bristling, kicking in village doors, searching women, driving like
NASCAR racers on city streets, and putting out cross-cultural gibberish
in ineffectual Information and Psyops campaigns.
CONCLUSION
The picture we paint in this chapter is not pretty. However, without
a major change in counterinsurgency strategy and signiﬁcant increase in
manpower, equipment (particularly aviation assets), and especially re-
construction funding, the United States may lose this war. Today, the
momentum—particularly in the counterinsurgency and the counternar-
cotics efforts—is running the wrong way. It is still possible to win—to
create a slowly developing but stable, conservative Islamic democracy in
Afghanistan generally free of terrorism—but not with the current resource
status quo, and not with the current tactics. The Taliban today has numer-
ous advantages, including comprehensive knowledge of the local culture,
language, and tribal hierarchies of which U.S. forces are completely igno-
rant, a virtually inexhaustible supply of recruits and money, mountain-
ous terrain that dramatically favors the insurgent, centuries of successful
experience in guerilla warfare against Western powers, patience, domina-
tion to the point of supremacy in Information Warfare, and perhaps most
importantly, ready sanctuary in much of northern Pakistan.
Major changes in the way the United States is doing business are needed
immediately, but even with them, the United States cannot do it alone.
It needs not just the energetic support of NATO but a robust and sus-
tained commitment from NATO to the brutal, hard, and often bloody busi-
ness of counterinsurgency, a type of warfare for which NATO has had
little training and almost no experience. The United Nations, nongovern-
mental organizations and the donor nations must do more as well. And
Afghanistan’s northern and Western neighbors must continue to avoid the
urge to excessively meddle in Afghan affairs—and, in the case of Uzbek-
istan, play a more positive role in supporting U.S. efforts, or risk a future
of Islamic terrorism exported from Afghanistan.
But the key to success or failure in Afghanistan lies below its southern
border, in northern Pakistan. As long as insurgents are virtually free to
cross the border at will, and Frontier Corps elements aid and abet their
movements, the insurgency cannot be shut down in Afghanistan. As the
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Soviets learned between 1979 and 1989, the border between Afghanistan
and Pakistan cannot be closed from the north. President Musharraf must
stop the two-faced game of appearing to be the ally of the United States in
the war on terrorism, while seeking to curry political favor with its worst
proponents in NWFP, Baluchistan, and the FATA. Thanks to ill-conceived
policies of encouragement and appeasement, the monster of Islamic fun-
damentalism in the north may now be too powerful to stop, but it’s not too
late to try. President Musharraf must assert national control in the north
and act boldly to shut down the major insurgent movements across the
border before the situation there spirals completely out of his control.
For its part, the United States must begin to ﬁght smarter and stop fol-
lowing the Taliban playbook. A complete change in counterinsurgency
strategy is required, and all U.S. soldiers must become cultural and lan-
guage warriors with months, not minutes, of training in both language
and culture before deployment. Quantum improvement is required in this
area; Human Rights Watch has already released a scathing report on the
conduct of American military personnel and the Afghan National Police,47
which are an almost unmitigated disaster of corruption, warlord crony-
ism, and incompetence.
Despite extreme poverty, a landmine-littered landscape, massive cor-
ruption, a ﬂedgling government whose authority outside of Kabul is very
limited, an ongoing insurgency, a shattered economy, booming opium
production and a host of other daunting problems, Afghanistan remains
geostrategically vital. The United States cannot repeat its post-Soviet inva-
sion abandonment of the country or fob the mission off on NATO, or the
results will be disastrous once again. By abandoning Afghanistan once,
the United States allowed the country to become a refuge for terrorist
groups to recruit, train, and wage war against the West. The effect on
Afghanistan, the region, and the rest of the world was dramatic and terri-
fying. This time, if we leave—or lose—the results will be even worse.
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